Abstract: Classical computations can not capture the essence of infinite computations very well. We will focus on a class of infinite computations called convergent infinite computations and, based on the study of the sequences of first order theories and their limits (Li, 1992) , establish a logical framework for describing and analyzing how an infinite computation interacts and evolves in changing environments and what the limit of the evolution might be. In this paper, a logic for convergent infinite computations is proposed by extending first order theories using Cauchy sequences, which has stronger expression power than the first order logic. A class of fixed points characterizing the logical properties of the limits can be represented by means of infinite-length terms defined by Cauchy sequences. We will show that the limit of sequence of first order theories can be defined in terms of distance, similar to the ǫ − N style definition of limits in real analysis. In addition, a computation model, called procedure scheme, for convergent infinite computations is proposed, on the basis of classical Turing machine and formal theory sequences and their limits. As two examples of application of the above study, (1) logic programs and their semantic interpretations are extended by introducing sequences of logic programs and sequences of least models and their limits, (2) the limit behavior of data mining is discussed by means of limits of theory sequences.
1.Introduction
The need of studying infinite computations has been emphasized in recent years, e.g., see (Vardi and Wolper, 1994) . By infinite computations, one means the computations done by some programs that create non-terminating processes or very long-time running processes. For such programs, the computations done by them usually go through infinite sequences of running states (or configurations), unlike finite computations in which only finite sequences of running states are involved.
Furthermore, over computer networks there is a very large family of computations which are carried out very long time (approximately treated as infinite time) and need constantly to interact with other processes and access some huge sets of external data over networks (approximately treated as infinite sets of data). For example, various procedures for knowledge discovery from databases over Internet do such computations.
Convergent infinite computations
In the above-mentioned family, there is a large class of infinite computations that have the following characteristics: (1) They constantly access some huge sets of external data during the run time, and (2) the infinite sequences of running states, which they go through, are convergent to some certain limits as the time goes to the infinity. Such computations will be called convergent infinite computations in this paper.
In the following, we will focus on convergent infinite computations, and establish a logical framework for describing and analyzing how an infinite computation interacts and evolves in changing environments and what the limit of the evolution might be. This requires us to study the computational behaviors from the point of view of analyzing long-time changes, because such computations depend fundamentally on the nature of the long-time changes and classical computations may not capture their essence well.
As well known, a computation can be expressed by a first order theory. We will give a framework for convergent infinite computations by expressing infinite computations with sequences of first order theories. Our approach is based on the study of the sequences of first order theories and their limits (Li, 1992) , and the problems of infinite computations are reduced to that of sequences of first order theories and their limits. The concept of limit of a sequence of first order theories in (Li, 1992) , different from the previous concepts of the limit involved in computer science and mathematical logic, is used to characterize that some theory is infinitely approached but maybe never is reached. This concept is suitable for describing the evolution of formal systems by interaction with external information.
We will discuss a class of ideal long-time changes, i.e., long-time changes with some "continuous" nature, by extending first order theories and domains using Cauchy sequences. The extension is similar to that of rational numbers to real numbers. We will show that the semantic interpretations of first order theories are enriched by extending domains using Cauchy sequences. In addition, we show that the limit of sequence of first order theories can be defined in terms of distance, similar to the ǫ − N style definition of limits in real analysis.
In sections 2,3 and 4, based on the study on sequences of first order theories and their limits, a logic for convergent infinite computations is proposed by extending first order theories using Cauchy sequences, which has stronger expression power than the first order logic. A class of fixed points characterizing the logical properties of the limits can be represented by means of infinite-length terms defined by Cauchy sequences. Furthermore, we study the relations between the convergence of theory sequences and of model sequences to characterize the limits of formal theory sequences from both proof-theoretical and model-theoretical approaches.
A model for convergent infinite computations
A computation model, called procedure scheme, for convergent infinite computations is proposed in section 5, on the basis of classical Turing machine and formal theory sequences and their limits. Informally, procedure scheme = T uring machine + limit of f ormal theory sequence. The main points are as follows. Turing machines are extended to accept infinite inputs and do infinite computations by accepting a sequence of finite inputs and producing a sequence of finite outputs during the runtime. The model is used to describe the dynamical behavior of the long time running and interactive programs. The convergence of the sequence of outputs can characterize the rationality and correctness of the infinite computations. For example, machine learning process, particularly inductive learning process, data mining process and so on, can be described using procedure schemes.
In section 6, convergent infinite computations are applied to logic programs. Logic programs can be extended by introducing sequences of logic programs and their limits, and the semantic interpretations of the limit of logic program sequences can be given by establishing the relations between limits of logic program sequences and limits of model sequences, thus, the semantic interpretations of logic programs are enriched. We get a sufficient condition for the limit of model sequences of the logic program sequences to be convergent to a model of the limit of the logic program sequences. It is interesting that this condition is similar to the Lipschitz condition guaranteeing the convergence of iteration maps in dynamical system study.
In section 7, we discuss the limit behavior of data mining by means of limits of theory sequences. In some cases, conventional strategy of data mining may lose many useful rules implied in the databases. We will show that if we use the distance in the strategy of the data mining algorithm the information implied in the databases will be preserved as much as possible.
Comparison with related work
1. In the infinitary logic (Vardi and Wolper, 1994) and (Abiteboul, Vardi and Vianu, 1995) there are formulas of infinite length, but there is no term of infinite length. We give a logic for the infinite length terms and discuss the convergence problem of logical theory sequences. The logic for the infinite length is different from the infinite logic in expressiveness and logic properties. For example, being finite can be expressed in the infinite logic, and a fix point of a monotonic function in a complete lattice can be expressed in the logic for the infinite length terms. The compactness theorem does not hold in the infinite logic, but does in the logic for the infinite length terms.
2. In real machines Smale, 1989, 1998) and analytic machines (Chadzelek and Hotz, 1999 ), a computation model for real numbers is established to characterize continuous computations. We discuss the computation problem on infinite length terms (infinite length strings over an infinite alphabet) to characterize "continuous" symbolic computations. In addition, we discuss the problems on the interactions with external information during computations.
3. To study the approximation problem of inductive logic programming and machine learning, the distance of Herbrand interpretations is discussed (NienhuysCheng, 1997, 1998). The approximation concept in this paper, similar to the approximation concept in real analysis, is more general, and is used to characterize that some theory is infinitely approached but may never be reached. Usually, the approximation sequences are non-monotonic. The semantic interpretations of first order theories are enriched by extending Herbrand universe to real Herbrand universe using Cauchy sequences.
Notation Our notation is standard. The notation in mathematical logic follows from [9] , [10] , and in deductive databases follows from [6] . We use Γ to denote theories or logic programs, and ρ to denote the distances between terms, formulas, theories and logic programs. We use ω to denote the set of all the natural numbers, i, j, k, m, n to denote the natural numbers, f, g, h to denote functions, p, q to denote predicates, and t, r, s to denote terms, x, y, z to denote variables, ϕ, ψ to denote the formulas, and R to denote the relations as in relational databases.
The Cauchy sequences of terms.
We pay attention to not only the convergent infinite computations which runs in a long run, but also the possible outputs of such computations. To research such outputs of convergent infinite computations, we should have a way to represent such outputs.
In description logic, a recursive definition such as X = f (X) may have many solutions, where f is a monotonic operator. By Tarski's theorem, there is a unique least fixed solution A 0 and a unique greatest fixed solution A 1 to the definition. What kinds of description logical properties A 0 should have is a very interesting problem in description logic.
In mathematical analysis, given a continuous function f and a real number x, we cannot compute f (x) directly. Instead, we can approximate f (x) by computing f (x ′ ) for some rational number x ′ close enough to x. f (x) can be taken as a result of infinite computations (f (x 1 ), f (x 2 ), ..., f (x k ), ...), where the distance between x and x k is less than 1 k .
In the following two sections we shall give a logic framework for the convergent infinite computations based on the distance defined on the terms of a language. In this section we shall give the distance on the terms of a language which is basically equivalent to the distance defined on trees. In the next section we shall give a logic for the infinitary terms.
Before giving the definition of the infinite terms, we first define a distance on the terms of some language.
Let L be a language consisting of constant symbols, variable symbols, predicate symbols and function symbols; the logic connectives: ¬, ∨, ∧, →, ∀, ∃. We shall use c, d, ... to denote the constant symbols, x, y, z, ... to denote the variable symbols, f, g, h, ... the function symbols and p, q, ... the predicate symbol.
A string t of symbols in L is a term if (2.1) t = c is a constant symbol, or (2.2) t = x is a variable symbol, or (2.3) t = f (t 1 , ..., t n ), where f is an n-ary function and t 1 , ..., t n are terms. We call the terms as the finitary terms, denote the set of all the finitary terms by FT L (we usually omit L when no confusion occurs).
We define a distance on FT. Nienhuys-Cheng (Nienhuys-Cheng, 1997) proposed a distance on terms and formulas. Here, we give a ramified definition of a distance on FT.
Definition 2.1. Let f and g be an n ′ -ary and an n-ary function symbols, respectively. The distance ρ : FT × FT → 1 m : m ∈ ω is defined as follows. The definition of the distance on terms and formulas is a little different from the one given by Nienhuys-Cheng in that the value, the distance can take, has a simple form 1 m for some natural number. Such a defined distance is used to define the distance between two trees in graph theory. Every term t can be taken as a tree T t . For example, t = f (t 1 , ..., t n ), the tree T t has a root with symbol f and n-many children T t 1 , ..., T tn . We say that two terms t and t ′ are same to depth m if T t ⌈m is isomorphic to T t ′ ⌈m, where T t ⌈m = {α ∈ T t : |α| < m}. The distance defined here have the basic properties that the distance defined by Nienhuys-Cheng has. Proposition 2.3. (2.7) t and t ′ are the same to depth m if and only if ρ(t,
It follows from the proposition that for any term t ∈ FT, there is a number m such that for any term t ′ , either t ′ = t or ρ(t ′ , t) > 1 m .
Definition 2.4. Given two Cauchy term sequence t ′ = {t ′ k } and t = {t k }, we define the distance ρ(t, t ′ ) = lim
Proposition 2.5. ≡ is an equivalence relation on FT ∪ IT.
Proposition 2.6. For any set A ⊆ FT and infinitary term t ∈ IT, if for any number m there is a term t ′ ∈ A with ρ(t, t ′ ) ≤ 1 m then there is a Cauchy term sequence t ′′ ⊆ A such that t ′′ ≡ t.
We define the substitutions as in the first order logic. Proposition 2.7. Given a finite term t(x), let Θ 1 = r 1 /x, Θ 2 = r 2 /x be any two substitutions. Let m be least such that x occurs in the depth m of t, then
. Therefore, given any finitary term t, {tΘ k } is a Cauchy term if and only if {Θ k } is a Cauchy sequence, where {Θ k } is a Cauchy sequence if {y k } is a Cauchy sequence and Θ k = x/y k for every k.
Notice that for some infinitary term t(x), t(r) ≡ t(r ′ ) for any terms r and r ′ . For example, given an infinitary term t(x) = {t k (x)} with one variable such that m k tends to infinity, where m k is the least depth at which x occurs, e.g., t k (x) = f k (x) for some function symbol f , then ρ(t(r), t(r ′ )) = 0 for any terms r and r ′ . In another words, when t is some infinitary term satisfying certain conditions then substituting any terms results in equivalent terms.
A logic system L IT for the infinitary terms
Given a language L, let FT and IT are the sets defined as in the last section. Let TERM = FT ∪ IT be the set of all terms in L IT . We use L to denote the first order logic on L. We assume two basic axioms on syntax:
(3.1) The classes of variables, function symbols, predicate symbols, constant symbols are all disjoint.
(3.
2) The different variables are not equal.
An atomic formula of L IT is one of the following forms:
where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and t 1 , ..., t n ∈ TERM. The formulas of L IT are defined as in the first order logic. We assume that the axioms and the rules of inference of L IT are these in the first order logic.
The interpretations of L IT is defined on a structure N which is constructed from a pre-structure M, and M is a universe of an interpretation of L.
A pre-structure M for L IT is a pair M = M, h such that M is a nonempty set; h is a functions with dom(h) ⊆ L; h(c) ∈ M ; h(f ) : M n → M if f is an n-ary function symbol; and h(p) ⊆ M n if p is an n-ary predicate symbol.
An assignment in M is a function s such that if x is a variable symbol then s(x) ∈ M. Given an assignment s and a finitary term t, we can define s(t) inductively:
Just as extending the rational numbers to the real numbers, we extend a prestructure M to be a structure N = N, h ′ , where
where s is an assignment and ≃ is an equivalence relation on
we call it a real part of the structure. Let a = {a k }, and a k = s(t k ) for every k, and t = {t k }, we denote a = s(t). ≃ is defined as follows: given any two a = {a k } and b = {b k }, a ≃ b if and only if there are t, t ′ ∈ IT and an assignments s such that t ≡ t ′ , a = s(t) and b = s(t ′ ). We call N an algebraically closed extension of M.
For any n-ary
, and for any a 1 , ..., a n belong to the real part of
We interpret the terms and formulas in N as in the classical first order logic. Given an assignment s and a term t, we can define s(t) inductively: if t is finitary then s(t) is defined as above; if t = f (t 1 , ..., t n ) and
The truth value of a formula ϕ under an assignment s is defined inductively. ϕ is true in N under an assignment s, denoted by N , s |= ϕ, if
L IT has the more stronger expressiveness than the first order logic. For example, let L be the language consisting of one function symbol f and one constant symbol c. The fix point of a function f, which cannot be expressed in the first order logic, can be expressed in L IT by t = f ∞ (a), and f (t) = t, where
The continuity of predicates and functions
The continuous functions are a very important notion in mathematical analysis. By the definition of the assignments, the predicate symbols and function symbols under the interpretation have some continuous properties. We shall give a formal definition of the continuity of the predicate and function symbols in syntax and semantics.
Given an n-ary function symbol f, f is syntactically-continuous at t = (t 1 , ..., t n ) if lim
. f is syntactically-continuous if f is syntacticallycontinuous at every t. By the definition of the distance, we have the following Proposition 4.1. Every function symbol f is syntactically-continuous. Given an n-ary predicate symbol p, p is syntactically-continuous at t = (t 1 , ..., t n ) if there is a number m such that for any finitary term tuple r = (r 1 , ..., r n ), ρ(r, t) < 1 m implies p(r) = p(t).
We now define the continuity in semantics. Given a pre-structure M, let N = N, h be its algebraically closed extension. Let p be an n-ary predicate symbol.
By the definition of the assignment, every h(f ) is continuous.
We now focus on the continuity of the predicate symbols and give a logic system L c which is an extension of L IT . In L IT , for any predicate p and infinitary term t, if p(t) is true under some interpretation then there is a rational number δ > 0 such that for every finitary term s with ρ(s, t) < δ, p(s) is true under the interpretation. We show that such an axiomatized logic L c is sound and complete.
L c has the following axioms (4.1) If p(t) for t ∈ TERM then there is a rational number δ > 0 of form 1 m for some m such that for any r ∈ FT, ρ(r, t) ≤ δ implies p(r).
Given a set Γ of formulas (theory), a proof of Γ is a sequence {ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ m } of formulas such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, either ϕ i is an axiom, or ϕ i ∈ Γ or deducted from two precedent formulas in the list by the inference rules. A sentence ϕ is a theorem of Γ, denoted by Γ ⊢ ϕ, if there is a proof {ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ m } of Γ such that ϕ = ϕ m .
A sentence ϕ is valid in a structure N , denoted by N |= ϕ, if N , s |= ϕ for any assignment s. We say that ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ if for every structure N , N |= Γ implies N |= ϕ. Since Γ ′ ⊢ p(t), there is a finite set Φ ∪ Ψ of formulas such that Φ ⊆ Γ and every formula σ ∈ Ψ has the form ∃xϕ(x) → ϕ(c) for some c ∈ L ′ − L. Without loss of generality, assume that Ψ = {σ}. Then Combining the above discussion, we have that Γ ⊢ p(t) and there is a sequence
with ρ(r, t) < δ. By the above discussion, Γ ′′ is consistent. Then construct the maximal consistent extension of Γ ′′ into Γ ′′′ .
By the maximum of Γ ′′′ , we know that for any n-ary predicate symbol p and terms t 1 , ..., t n , either p(t 1 , ..., t n ) ∈ Γ ′′′ or ¬p(t 1 , ..., t n ) ∈ Γ ′′′ .
We construct a pre-model M as follows: let M = {t ∈ L ′ : t is closed}, and for every function symbol f we define a function
and for every predicate symbol p, we define a relation
and for every constant symbol c we define h(c) = c. We define an equivalence relation ∼ on M such that for any t, s ∈ M,
We can prove that ∼ is an equivalence relation on M, and satisfies the following claim:
Hence, ∼ is a congruence with respect to the basic relations and functions. We define another structure N = M/ ∼ . We shall use [t] to denote the equivalence class containing t. By the induction on t we can prove that i) if t ≡ c then
It is routine to show that for any sentence ϕ ∈ Γ ′′′ , N |= ϕ ⇔ Γ ′′′ ⊢ ϕ.
Remarks 4.5. 4.4. Given any infinitary t, if there is a δ > 0 such that for every finitary s, d(s, t) < δ implies p(s), it is possible that ¬p(t).
4.5. Given any infinitary term t, if p(t) then it is possible that for any δ > 0, there is an term s such that ρ(s, t) < δ and ¬p(s). That is, we do not require that for every infinitary term t, if p(t) then there is a δ > 0 such that for any (finitary or infinitary) term s, ρ(s, t) < δ implies p(s).
Procedure Schemes for Theory Sequences
In this section, we will define a computation model based on the classical Turing machine which allows the convergent infinite computations. Similarly we can define the distance of two formulas, two theories or two models. Now, we are ready to give the following definition of a computation model for computing the limit of theory sequences in L IT . Definition 5.2. (Procedure scheme) Let Γ and a k be a finite set of sentences and a sentence in L IT , respectively, and
where ϕ is a procedure (which can be expressed by a Turing machine).
S k , and define
Then, ϕ(Γ, S) is called a procedure scheme, Γ is called an initial theory.
Remark 5.3:
1. In general, ϕ(Γ, S) is not a result produced by procedure ϕ because S is infinite and cannot be an input of a Turing machine. In fact, in each computation of ϕ, the output of ϕ is some Γ k which is an approximation of ϕ(Γ, S) and may not equal ϕ(Γ, S). The limit can be viewed as a result of a generalized Turing machine which allows infinite inputs and produces infinite convergent sequence.
2. S k = {a 1 , · · · , a k } is a formal description or an observation of the world. In practice, S k can be example sets (training sets) from huge databases on the networks.
3. If for some k, ϕ(Γ k , a k+1 ) does not halt, then Γ k+1 ↑, where ↑ denotes undefined computation. Thus, for this case, lim k→∞ Γ k does not exist.
Note that if S = ∅, then the procedure scheme defines the classical computations by a Turing machine. In other words, it defines computations in the closed world. The various resolution procedures are the typical examples for this case (Robinson, 1965) . If S = ∅, then the procedure scheme defines a class of computations, or say, it defines computations in the open world. The proofs of Lingenbuam's theorem, the extentions used in default logic, and the problems of knowledge base maintenance, specification capturing, the rationality of inductive reasoning, and a class of agents used in the Internet can be defined by the procedure schemes (Li, 1995 (Li, , 1999 and (Li and Ma, 2000) .
As usual, ϕ can be extended to ϕ * in the following way.
where Γ, A and a are finite sets of sentences and a sentence in language L IT .
Lemma 5.5.
We shall use {e} for natural number e to denote the e-th Turing machine, and {e} A to denote the e-th Turing machine with oracle A. Here, {e} can be taken as a function defined on the finitary terms of a language L. Not every Turing computable function on FT induces a function on TERM. We shall use ϕ to denote a Turing computable function from FT to FT such that ϕ is continuous, i.e., for any Cauchy term sequences t and s, t ≡ s implies that {ϕ(t n ) : n ∈ ω} ≡ {ϕ(s n ) : n ∈ ω}. A function f : TERM → TERM is computable if there is a Turing computable and continuous function ϕ : FT → FT such that for every t ∈ TERM, f (t) = {ϕ(t n ) : n ∈ ω} if{ϕ(t n ) : n ∈ ω}is a Cauchy term sequence undefined otherwise, where t ≡ {t n : n ∈ ω}. Such defined computable functions on TERM are not equivalent to the partial recursive operators from 2 ω to 2 ω . We know that a operator E : 2 ω → 2 ω is partially recursive if there is a Turing machine {e} such that for any α ∈ 2 ω , E(α)(n) = {e} α (n) for every n ∈ ω. A computable function f on TERM is equivalent to the partially computable operator E, since for any α ∈ 2 ω ,
where α⌈n is a restriction of α up to n, and we take every infinitary term as a function from ω to FT.
Hence, the computable functions on TERM are something between partially computable functions (Turing computable functions) and partially computable operators.
Generally, we can define similar computable functions on any continuous (and algebraically closed) ring R.
A ring R is continuous if there is a subset Q of R such that R is the algebraical closure of Q and Q is countable and metric. By the definition of the Cauchy sequences on Q, we assume that the definition of the Cauchy sequences on Q can be extended to the Cauchy sequences on R such that every Cauchy sequence of R is equal to some element x in R, and every Cauchy sequence on R has an equivalent Cauchy sequence on Q. We can define Turing computable functions on Q as usual. Not every Turing computable functions on Q can induce a function on R. We shall use ϕ : Q → Q to denote a continuous function, i.e., for any two Cauchy sequences x and y on Q, x ≡ y implies {ϕ(x n ) : n ∈ ω} ≡ {ϕ(y n ) : n ∈ ω} if x = {x n ∈ Q : n ∈ ω} and y = {y n ∈ Q : n ∈ ω}.
A function f : R → R is computable if there is a Turing computable and continuous function ϕ on Q such that for any x ∈ R, f (x) = {ϕ(x n ) : n ∈ ω} if {ϕ(x n ) : n ∈ ω} is a Cauchy term sequence undefined otherwise, where x ≡ {x n : n ∈ ω}. For example, Let Q be the set of the rational numbers. Then R is the set of the real numbers. For any x ∈ R, function
is a computable function on the real numbers. Because for any n ∈ ω, x ′ ∈ Q,
is computable, since ϕ(n, x ′ ) can defined recursively by the recursive function g(n, y ′ , x ′ ) = y ′ + x ′n n! , where y ′ ∈ Q. Hence, for any real number x, f (x) = y, where y = {y n :
n ∈ ω}, and y n = ϕ(n, x n ).
Both definitions of the computable functions on any continuous ring R are different from the BSS definition. In fact, both the definitions make taking limits as the computable processes, since ϕ(x) = lim n→∞ f (n, x⌈n).
Chadzelek and Hotz(1999) defined the analytic machines which are defined on the real numbers and the rational numbers, and in which the infinite computations are allowed. The computable functions defined here is different from the analytic machines in the following point: a computable function defined by an analytic machine produces an infinite sequence of outputs after input; and the computable functions defined here produce infinite sequences of outputs only after infinite sequence of inputs, and for every input, the computation terminates.
The real logic programs
In this section, we shall use the infinitary terms in logic programs. Firstly, we shall extend the Herbrand base (universe) to the real Herbrand base (universe) in which infinitary terms can occur; secondly, we shall extend the clauses in logic programs to contain infinitary terms and extend the interpretations of the real logic programs; and thirdly, we shall give a sufficient condition for a Cauchy sequence of real Horn logic programs to have as the least real Herbrand model the limit of the least real Herbrand models of the real logic programs. Definition 6.1. A Cauchy term sequence is called a real Herbrand term, and p(t 1 , ..., t n ) for t 1 , ..., t n ∈ TERM is called a real atom, where p is an n-ary predicate symbol. Define RHU = IT ∪ FT, RHB = {p(t 1 , ..., t n ) : p is an n-predicate symbol, t 1 , ..., t n ∈ RHU}.
RHU and RHB are called a real Herbrand universe and a real Herbrand base, respectively.
Definition 6.2. A real literal is a real atom or the negation of a real atom. A real atom is called a positive real literal whereas a negated real atom is called a negative real literal. Definition 6.3. A real clause q ← q 1 , ..., q m is called a rule; is called a fact, if m = 0; and a goal, if q is empty. We shall use π to denote a clause. q is called the rule head, denoted by head(π) and q 1 , ..., q m is called the rule body, denoted by body(π).
A real logic program, denoted by Γ, is a set of real clauses. Γ may contain infinitely many real clauses.
A clause π is Horn if π has at most one positive literal. A real logic program is Horn if every its clause is Horn.
A real clause π is called finitary if there is no infinitary term occurring in it; otherwise π is called infinitary.
Definition 6.4. An Herbrand interpretation of a real logic program Γ is any subset I of the real Herbrand base I ⊆ RHB. Given a real logic program Γ, a real Herbrand interpretation I is a real Herbrand model of Γ if for any substitution Θ and a clause π, body(π)Θ ⊆ I implies head(π)Θ ∈ I. Proposition 6.5. Given a real logic program Γ, Γ has a model iff Γ has a real Herbrand model.
Proof. Let N be a model of Γ. We define a real Herbrand model M of Γ by
It can be shown by induction on the length of clauses that M is a real Herbrand model of Γ.
For the real Horn programs, the Van Emden, Kowalski theorem holds too. Theorem 6.6. Let Γ be a real Horn program and let M(Γ) denote the set of all real Herbrand models of Γ. Then the model intersection property holds, i.e.,
M is a real Herbrand model of Γ. Correspondingly, the same procedure works to produce the least real Herbrand model of a real Horn program.
Let Γ be a real Horn program. We define a mapping f Γ : 2 RHB → 2 RHB by
where Θ is any substitution. Proposition 6.7. If Γ is a Horn program then f Γ is monotonic and finitary. Moreover, f ω Γ is the least real Herbrand model of Γ, where f ω Γ is the least fixpoint of
We define a sequence of models {M k } converges if {M k } is a Cauchy sequence, namely, for any number m > 0, there is a K such that for any j,
. We say that M is the limit of a Cauchy sequence
We assume that Assumption 6.9. Given any clause π = p 1 (t 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ p n (t n ) → p(t), there are terms τ (t 1 , ..., t n ) such that t = τ (t 1 , ..., t n ).
By Assumption 6.9, we would like to establish some sufficient condition for the convergence of infinitely many real Horn logic programs. We first give a fact that can be proved easily.
Given such a clause π, we use body(π) to denote p 1 (t 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ p n (t n ), and use head(π) to denote p(t). By Proposition 2.7, we have the following Proposition 6.10. Given any clause π and two substitutions Θ 1 , Θ 2 , we have that
Corollary 6.11. Given an sequence {Θ n } of substitutions and a formula π, if {body(π)Θ n } is a Cauchy sequence then {head(π)Θ n } is a Cauchy sequence.
Remark: Let ϕ : body(π) → head(π), the above proposition can be rewritten as
which is an analogoue to the Lipschitz condition in dynamical systems
where m is a constant. Here for our proposition m is taken to be 1.
In the following we shall assume that every real logic program Γ is Horn and let M (Γ) be the least real Herbrand model of Γ. Proof. We prove that M is a real Herbrand model of Γ, that is, given any clause π ∈ Γ and substitution Θ such that body(π)Θ ∈ M, then head(π)Θ ∈ M.
If π is a fact of Γ then there is a K such that for any k ≥ K, π ∈ Γ k and q = π ∈ M k . Hence, there is a Cauchy sequence q k such that q k ∈ M k and q = lim k→∞ q k .
If π ∈ Γ is not a fact then, without loss of generality, let q ′ = body(π)Θ ∈ M. Then there is a Cauchy seqence {q ′ k } and a K such that
Cauchy sequence, and
Given any q in the least real Herbrand model of Γ, we want to show that there is a Cauchy sequence {q k } such that q k ∈ M k for sufficiently large k and q = lim k→∞ q k .
Let M ′ be the least real Herbrand model of Γ. We prove the claim by induction on n, the step at which q enters M ′ . The proof is similar to the discussion given above.
By the proof of Theorem 6.12, we know that the theorem holds for any Cauchy sequence {Γ k } of real Horn programs such that every clause in the limit of {Γ k } is finitary.
The theorem does not hold if the given sequence {Γ k } is a Cauchy sequence. For example, assume that for every k,
where a is a constant symbols, q is a unary predicate symbol and f, g are two unary function symbols. Then, {Γ k } is a Cauchy sequence, and
where
} is the least real Herbrand model of Γ k , and {M k } is a Cauchy sequence, and M = lim
But, the least real Herbrand model of Γ is
Hence, M is not a model of Γ. By the same proof of theorem 6.12, we have the following Theorem 6.13. Given a Cauchy sequence {Γ k } of real Horn programs such that every clause except facts in Γ = lim Proof. We construct a Cauchy sequence {M k } such that M k is a model of Γ k for every k and M = lim k→∞ M k . Firstly we construct a sequence {M ′ k } of sets. If q ∈ M is a fact of Γ then there is a Cauchy sequence {q k } such that q k ∈ Γ k is a fact of Γ k for every k and q = lim k→∞ q k , let q k ∈ M ′ k for every k. Given a clause π ∈ Γ, assume that there is a substitution Θ such that body(π)Θ ⊆ M. Without loss of generality, let q = body(π)Θ. Then, there is a sufficiently large K such that for any k ≥ K, π ∈ Γ k and there is a substitution Θ k with body(π)
To see this, by the construction of {M k }, a Cauchy sequence {q k } can only produce another Cauchy sequence via a fixed finitary clause, and every Cauchy sequence {q k } is produced in such a way.
The same conclusion does not hold if we do not extend the Herbrand universe. Let Γ k = {p(x) ← p(f (x)), p(f k (a))}, where p is a unary predicate symbol, f is a unary function symbol and a is a constant symbol. Then {Γ k } is a Cauchy sequence and the least Herbrand model of Γ k is
and every model of Γ k is a supset of M k , and {M 1 , M 2 , ..., M k , ...} are the Herbrand models of Γ. Therefore, for every model M n , there is no Cauchy sequence {M ′ k } of models such that M ′ k is a Herbrand model of Γ k and lim k→∞ M ′ k = M n .
7. Another application: the limit behaviors of data-mining In the relational databases, a data mining algorithm is based on the following basic strategy. Such a strategy may lose many useful rules implied in the databases. We shall show that if we use the distance in the strategy of the data mining algorithm the information implied in the databases will be preserved as much as possible.
Given a relation R = (U, A), where U is a nonempty universe of objects and A is a set of attributes, assume that A is decomposed into a set C of conditional attributes and a decision attribute d. Given a tuple r ∈ R, we define the support supp(R, r) of r as supp(R, r) = |V r | |R| , and confidence conf(R, r) of r as
where V r = {s ∈ R : ∀a ∈ C(s(a) = r(a))}, V r,r(d) = {s ∈ R : ∀a ∈ A(s(a) = r(a))}.
A datamining algorithm T produces a theory T (R) such that
where ǫ 0 and ǫ 1 are determined by T and practical applications, and
We consider the relations with noise. For any r ∈ R, there may be many tuples s such that s supports r and s is a noisy copy of r. In practice, s is an approximation of r which could be the results of the physical measurements of attributes of the objects. If we datamine R to get T (R) as above then we may lose many ϕ r for such an tuple r that there are many noised tuples supporting r. We can use the distance to cope with it.
Given a relation (U, A), assume that for every a, there is a distance ρ a on D a . Given two tuples r, s ∈ U, two kinds of the distance between r and s are defined by ρ(r, s) = max a∈A ρ a (r(a), s(a)), ρ C (r, s) = max a∈C ρ a (r(a), s(a)).
Given two relations R = (U, A) and R ′ = (U ′ , A), we define the distance between R and R ′ as follows: given any r ∈ U ′ , we define the distance between r and R by ρ(r, R) = min{ρ(r, s) : s ∈ R}, and the distance between R and R ′ by ρ(R, R ′ ) = max{ρ(r, R) : r ∈ R ′ }.
Then we have the following Proposition 7.1. For any relations R and R ′ ,
Given a tuple r ∈ R, we define a subset V r of U such that for any s ∈ U, s ∈ V r iff for every a ∈ A, r(a) = s(a). Given a real number x, we define the x-neighborhood V r,x of r by V r,x = {s ∈ U : ρ C (s, r) ≤ x}, V r,x,r(d) = {s ∈ U : ρ(s, r) ≤ x}.
Given a sequence {r k } of tuples, we say that {r k } is a Cauchy sequence if {ρ(r k , r k+1 )} is a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers and lim k→∞ ρ(r k , r k+1 ) = 0.
Similar to define the Cauchy sequences of relations. A Cauchy sequence {R k } of relations, we define the limit of {R k } inductively as
where r is a Cauchy sequence such that r = {r k } and r k ∈ R k for cofinitely many k, and R ′ k = R k − {r k }. For any tuple r ∈ R we define the support and confidence as follows:
where C is the set of all the sequences {i k } such that {i k : k ∈ ω} is an infinite subset of natural numbers. The following example shows that if we do not consider the noise tuples then we may lose much information. Example 7.3: For every k, let R k contain a tuple r and a set N k,r of noised tuples s of r such that (7.1) max s∈N k,r ρ(s, r) tends to zero as k tends to infinity, (7.2) s = s ′ for every s, s ′ ∈ N r ,
3) |N k,r | + 1 |R k | ≥ ǫ 0 , (7.4) supp(R k , r) < ǫ 0 , and (7.5) |D d | = 1. Then ϕ r ∈ T (R). In fact, we can define R k as follows: let A contain one attribute a such that D a = R, the set of real numbers. Let r(a) = 1 and let r ′ be another tuple such that r ′ (a) = 0. For any k, let R k = {r i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} such that r k (a) = Therefore, {T (R k )} is not a Cauchy sequence.
Here we give a data mining strategy T ′ based on the distance defined on R. Given a relation R = (U, A), let T ′ (R) be the theory data-mined by T ′ . Namely, where ρ(ϕ r,x , ϕ s,x ) = ρ(r, s). If ϕ r,x ∈ T (R) then every s with ρ(s, r) ≤ x is taken as an approximation of r, and we say that ϕ r,x is true with support supp x (R, r) and confidence conf x (R, r). If x = 0 then supp 0 (R, r) = supp(R, r) and conf 0 (R, r) = conf(R, r). Similarly, we can define the support and confidence of a tuple r in an infinite relation R by Proof. For the simplicity of the discussion, we pay attention to only the support in the proof. Assume that ϕ r ∈ T (R). Then supp(R, r) > ǫ 0 , and there is a Cauchy subsequence {R i k } and {r i k } such that r = lim k→∞ r i k , {i k : k ∈ ω} is unbounded in ω, and supp(R i k , r i k ) > ǫ 0 for every k. Then {ϕ r i k } is a Cauchy subsequence with limit ϕ r . Hence, the left is included in the right.
Assume that ϕ r ∈ lim k→∞ T ′ (R k ). Then there is a subsequence {i k } such that ϕ r = lim k→∞ ϕ r i k and ϕ r i k ∈ T ′ (R i k ) for every k. For every k, supp(R i k , r i k , x) > ǫ 0 .
By the definition and the property of the lower limits, we have that supp(R, r) ≥ ǫ 0 . Therefore, the right is included in the left.
Let {R k } be the Cauchy sequence given in the proposition. Then we have that T ′ (R) = {ϕ r , ϕ r ′ } with support equal to 1 2 .
